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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM
What is humor? That question has occupied the minds 
of such renowned philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, 
Kant, Hobbes, Spencer and Bergson. Yet, despite extensive 
philosophic speculation, a paucity of psychological experi­
mentation upon humor exists.
Why have psychologists been so reluctant to experi­
ment in this area? One can only speculate as to the answer. 
Perhaps, however, a little speculation might suggest an 
approach to humor that could help overcome the present 
research inertia in this area. Speculation is more likely 
to be of value, however, if the literature is first surveyed.
Upon doing so, it is difficult not to be impressed 
by two outstanding tendencies in humor theory and research:
1) the frequent equation of humor with laughter; and 2) the 
relative predominance of psychoanalytically-based studies. 
Oddly enough, these two tendencies are not unrelated; those 
of psychoanalytic persuasion seem especially prone to equate
1
2humor with laughter. For instance, in a recent survey, the 
psychoanalytically-oriented Flugel (1954) seems to treat 
humor and laughter as though they were synonyms.
The tendency to equate humor with laughter is not 
restricted to the psychoanalytically oriented, however.
Thus, Bergson's (1911) classic book on humor is actually 
entitled Laughter; Drever (1952) defines "humour" in terms 
of laughter.
Such an equation of humor with laughter, though, 
seems of questionable validity. Even the most cursory 
introspection should convince the reader that he often 
laughs for reasons other than because he is humored. Thus, 
a person may laugh when tickled, embarrassed, afraid, 
releasing tension, pretending to have gotten the point of 
a joke which went over his head, etc.
And, just as people need not be humored to laugh, so 
they need not laugh when humored. A humored man may avoid 
laughing to keep from embarrassing the butt of the joke, to 
remain unnoticed, to appear sophisticated, etc. Laughter, 
then, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
humor.
Thus, even the bravest experimental souls might shy 
away from humor experimentation, if they made the assumption, 
currently fashionable, that all instances of laughter must 
be accounted for by a general theory of humor.
But how else can humor be measured— if not through
3laughter? After all, psychologists cannot read minds 
directly; they must infer a humorous state through some 
behavioral index.
In some instances laughter is, as shall be shown 
later, a reasonably accurate guide to humor. However, one 
cannot safely assume a priori that wherever laughter occurs 
humor is uncovered. Laughter is only an accurate index of 
humor under certain conditions— and one task of experimental 
psychology is to help determine just what those conditions 
are.
There is, however, another way to measure humor— an 
approach which seems to avoid certain pits into which a 
humor theory, based solely on laughter, would fall. This 
other method would define humor as a mental experience, 
measurable through judgmental indices. Ss would be asked 
to reflect judgments as to the humor values of certain 
"humorous" materials through some behavioral index, such as 
sorting jokes into degrees of funniness. But here too it 
must be remembered that, as with laughter, so only under 
certain conditions are sortings accurate reflections of that 
mental experience called humor. Fortunately, however, the 
experimental conditions under which judgmental sortings are 
a reasonably accurate reflection of mental experience are 
suggested not only in a few judgmental studies on humor, but 
a good many judgmental studies in related areas as well.
The present study is concerned not to develop a
4general theory of humor, but simply to present a judgmental 
experiment. The foregoing discussion merely outlines the 
theoretical perspective into which the present work is 
embedded. Now that this perspective has been suggested, 
humor may be defined, for present purposes, as a learned 
mental experience of amusement towards an object.
The above definition suggests the following charac­
teristics: 1) humor is mental experience, not behavior;
2) this mental experience is learned; 3) the particular 
mental experience involved is one of amusement; and 4) humor 
implies a subject-object relationship.
Within this general outline, more specific theoreti­
cal considerations led to the present experiment:
The judgmental experiment to be presented is based 
on the postulate that an individual's attitudes are reflected 
in, and thus measurable by, his sense of humor. Both 
attitude and sense of humor are viewed as containing cognitive 
components of mental experience. An attitude is defined as a 
conceptually-rooted motive of affect towards an object. Fol­
lowing Sherif and Cantril (1947, p. 92), an ego is defined as 
a constellation of attitudes. The general construct of humor 
upon which this research is based is: £ joke is humorous to
the extent to which it enhances an object of affection and/or 
disparages an object of repulsion, and unhumorous to the 
extent that it does the opposite. Objects of affection are 
viewed as positively related to the ego, whereas objects of
5repulsion are seen as negatively related. Humor is enhanced 
when an object in which the individual is ego-involved 
(towards which he holds a positive attitude) triumphs in a 
joke and/or a negatively-related object loses, whereas rela­
tively unhumorous are those jokes at the expense of the 
object of identification, and/or which enhance a negatively- 
related object.
The hypotheses tested in the present experiment are 
somewhat more specific than the general principle of humor 
mentioned above. The greater specificity is partly a 
function of the introduction of the concept reference group. 
This concept was first used by Hyman (1942) who meant, 
essentially, a comparison group.
Muzafer Sherif early advocated use of the reference- 
group concept. Sherif's enthusiasm for the construct 
resulted from a broad perspective, which enabled him to 
relate the reference-group concept to the social sciences 
on one hand, and to experimental psychology on the other.
By reference group Sherif and Sherif (1956, p. 175) came to 
mean any group with which ^ identifies himself psychologi­
cally.
Sherif noted that the reference-group concept is 
necessary in modern society because, unlike the effects of 
simpler cultures, no longer does modern man's conceptual 
development result in a one-to-one correspondence between 
his membership and reference groups. Modern man does not
6always identify himself psychologically with those groups in 
which he revolves physically. Hence, the sociological con­
cept of group, or more specifically, "membership group," no 
longer encompasses the conceptual horizons, or identifica­
tions, of modern man. Since his psychological experiences 
are central to psychology, so reference group is a 
psychological, not a sociological, concept (Sherif and 
Sherif, 1956, pp. 176-177).
Sherif next tied reference group with the sociologi­
cal concept of group norm. When the individual identifies 
with a group it becomes his reference group; he internalizes 
its norms as his own ego attitudes (1956, pp. 628-635).
Thus is seen the social origin of important ego 
attitudes, which anchor the individual's perceptions, and 
render predictable his judgments of motivationally relevant 
stimuli. In a classic experiment, Sherif (1935) had earlier 
demonstrated how individuals form such norms.
Now that the theoretical base for the present 
research has been sketched, hypotheses may be formulated. 
First, however, the relevant literature ought to be surveyed. 
Such studies reveal how they helped shape the hypotheses and 
the experimental design which follows later.
Survey of Literature 
Modern surveys of the literature, some of which are 
concerned with humor in a more general way than is the 
present investigation, are found in Flugel (1954), Valentine
7(1942), Ghosh (1939), Perl (1933a), and Piddington (1933). 
More and Roberts (1957) discuss a few experimental studies 
and some theoretical work of leading philosophers and social 
scientists on humor; while Rosenberg and Shapiro (1958) 
relate various humor theories to marginality and Jewish 
humor.
The question as to whether or not humor has a social 
character is relevant to the present research (which is 
formulated within the theoretical context that the ability 
of an object to provoke a humorous experience ^  a function 
of social learning). It seems appropriate, therefore, to 
briefly mention a few works concerned with the relationship 
between humor and social character.
Henri Bergson (1911) may have been, as More and 
Roberts (p. 234) suggest, the first modern philosopher to 
emphasize the social character of laughter (or humor). Berg­
son (1911, p. 2) asserted "that the comic does not exist out­
side the pale of what is strictly human." And for him, the 
word human meant essentially what today might be labelled 
social.
Perl (1933b) found that humor appreciation is subject 
to social influence. Jokes presented to a group are found 
funnier than jokes judged in private.
Washburn's (1929) study on children reflects the 
social genesis of humor; both laughter and smiling, she 
found, arise from social interaction.
8Raley and Ballmann (1957), in noting the metamorphosis 
of humor through adolescence, also suggested its social 
character: "The most tentative conjecture based on current
findings is that, concerning the matter of humor as well as 
nearly all other personality traits, there are definite and 
well defined differences that occur due to adolescent develop­
ment" (p. 22).
After observing that the sez of the examiner exerted 
a major influence on their experimental results, Doris and 
Fierman (1956) remarked upon the social nature of this 
result. Their results indicated to them ^that such experi­
mentation should not focus exclusively on the stimulus 
materials, i.e., jokes or cartoons, per se. The social 
context appears to be crucial."
All the above studies, regarding the social character 
of humor, seem to suggest that jokes do not have absolute 
stimulating value— that the same joke told under different 
social circumstances, or to a different person, might produce 
a different effect.
Eysenck (1947) could discover little, if any, con­
sensus as to the relative humor values of various individual 
jokes or different kinds of humorous material (cartoons, 
limericks, verses, etc.). Flugel (1954, p. 726) found this 
result in accordance with that of Heim (1936), Qmwake (1939) 
and Stump (1939). On the basis of these studies Flugel 
concluded by questioning the justifiability of speaking "in
9general terms of a 'good joke'" (p. 726).
The social character in humor is also reflected by 
differences in the nature of the jokes which various races 
tell. For instance, Middleton and Moland (1959) studied the 
content of jokes told by white and Negro university students. 
They found that Negroes told more "anti-Negro" jokes based 
on the traditional stereotype of the Negro than did the 
whites. Negro students also told about four times as many 
"anti-Negro" jokes as "anti-white" jokes.
Eysenck (1944) studied the relationship between 
national character and humor. He often found greater dif­
ferences in the humor content of journals within nations 
than he did between nations. (His findings hardly seem 
surprising in that he studied only modern, Western nations. 
Sociologists often have observed social character to differ 
more between socio-economic classes within a modern nation 
than between people from different nations but of the same 
socio-economic class.)
More and Roberts also studied the social character 
of humor. They asked SS from three different socio­
economic classes to sort cartoons according to degrees of 
funniness. The authors found differences between classes to 
"accord fairly well both with expectations on the basis of 
the humor theory we have advanced and with various social 
stereotypes" (p. 241).
Middleton (1959) studied Negro and white reactions
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to racial humor. In this study, to be discussed more fully 
later, he found differences between middle- and lower-socio- 
economic-class Negroes, but not between middle- and lower- 
class whites.
An important problem in constructing the present 
experiment, as will be discussed later, revolved around such 
questions as whether or not well-known jokes could be used, 
and just how many jokes should be used. The following 
studies relate to these problems:
Hollingsworth (1911) found, when the same jokes were 
presented again to the same that some jokes "waxed" and
others "waned." In other words, the waxing jokes were 
judged funnier upon repetition, while waning jokes lost some 
of their humorous effect.
Cattell and Luborsky (1957, p. 407) also raised the 
question of familiarity with jokes and the effects:
The main design of our experiment . . . limits our 
investigation of such subsidiary questions as that of 
the effect of familiarity. We could obtain a partial 
answer, however, by the following analyses: (^ ) Cor­
relating individuals' scores on 'number of jokes known 
beforehand' with scores on 'total number of jokes 
considered funny.' This . . . yielded a negligible 
correlation of -.09. The result does not necessarily 
prove that familiarity has no effect on funniness of an 
individual joke; it indicates only that people familiar 
with more jokes are hot inclined to rate the jokes as a 
whole as more or less funny than do people less steeped 
in the lore of humor. (b) Secondly, we could find 
whether the average funnTness rating of the jokes rises 
or falls between the first and second administration.
It fell, from a mean of 24.7 to one of 17.2, a fairly 
considerable fall.
Cattell and Luborsky (p. 407) also noted Eysenck's
XX
(X943, p. X95) finding that jokes aXready known to 86 tended
to be better Xiked than others. AXX this Xed CatteXX and
Luborsky to the tentative concXusion:
. . . that the subject remembers, and therefore is 
famiXiar with, jokes that he especiaXXy Xikes; but that 
famiXiarity forced by circumstances (in this case, 
rereading aXX jokes) appreciabXy reduces the funniness 
of jokes in generaX (p. 407).
In a more recent study, Lee and Griffith (X960) 
confirmed the tentative concXusion of CatteXX and Luborsky, 
i.e., that S most readiXy remembers jokes which he especiaXXy 
Xikes. Lee and Griffith, however, were not concerned with 
the effects of joke famiXiarity upon humor vaXues. Rather, 
they were interested in the reXationship between forgetting 
of humor and repression. As they stated (p. 436):
The eXusiveness of jokes . . .  is attributed by 
psychoanaXysis to repression. Humor, Xike dreams, sXips 
by the censor, who quickXy recXoses the door. In this 
study a large number of New Yorker cartoons were paired 
randomly for each subject who chose the one of each pair 
which was the funnier. A month Xater each subject 
returned to sort the original cartoons from some new 
ones mixed in with them. Contrary to what should be 
expected were repression an active force, subjects 
correctly identified more of those cartoons which had 
previously impressed them as funny.
After presenting whole series of jokes, Martin (X905) 
observed both "fun^fatigue" and "fun-accumuXation." She 
concluded (p. 47):
Without doubt very long series of experiments would 
show fun-fatigue as a controlling factor, but the 
influence of one comic picture on another as regards the 
comic impression, investigated in this and other experi­
mental series, and the experiences of every day life as 
weXX as the above results, show that fun accumulation 
may be a controlling factor in a short series.
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A large proportion of humor research deals vith 
personality traits and individual differences. Most of 
these studies are irrelevant for purposes here. A few are 
pertinent, however, either because of methodological contri­
butions or side issues discussed therein— or because such 
studies also deal with social data, though often in a 
disguised language. Thus, some studies most pertinent to 
the present research, i.e.. More and Roberts, Wolff, Smith 
and Murray, and Roberts and Johnson, are actually couched in 
personality terms. A "personality" experiment by Cattell 
and Luborsky contains interesting side issues. However, as 
the present work focuses not upon personality experiments 
per se, these personality experiments are discussed elsewhere 
in this chapter, under diverse headings.
Validity of Judgment Method 
The question concerning validity of judgmental 
ratings in humor measurement is important; what 86 rate as 
funny and what they consider funny may differ. Therefore, 
relevant experimental literature becomes highly pertinent.
Perhaps the oldest and most respected area in 
experimental psychology is psychophysics. The validity of 
100 years of extensive experimentation in this field rests 
upon the basic assumption that S's judgments can be measured 
through his ratings. When instructions to 8 are appropriately 
given, this assumption seems warranted, at least such appears 
to be the consensus among experimental psychologists. The
13
psychophysical experiments by Wolff et al. and Roberts and 
Johnson, through a process of cross checks, tested this 
validity assumption.
Wolff et al. tested the validity assumption by means 
of a hidden motion picture camera which recorded S's facial 
expressions as he responded to jokes. These facial expres­
sions were found to relate to judgments in such a manner as 
to leave little doubt, in the Wolff et experiment, 
regarding the validity of the psychophysical method. As 
Cattell and Luborsky (1947, p. 404) remarked: " . . .  Wolff,
Smith, and Murray . . . found reasonable indications that 
elaborate physiological or objective measures give results 
essentially the same as those of subjective report." Each 
of the several methods of measuring humor used by Wolff et 
al. may be viewed as a validity check on the others. (See 
tables Wolff et al. presented; pp. 352 and 360.)
Having also tested this validity assumption, Roberts 
and Johnson (1957, p. 61) stated:
A question might be raised concerning the validity 
of the subjects' verbal ratings to the cartoons. It is 
possible, particularly with a group of mental patients, 
that what the subjects rate as funny and what they actu­
ally consider funny are entirely different. To check 
this possibility a comparison was made between the 
laughter and smile responses made by the subjects to the 
cartoons and their humor ratings. The correlation 
between these measures was .87, significant at the .01 
level. This indicates that those subjects who laughed 
and smiled the most gave high ratings to the cartoons.
Thus we have demonstrated agreement between overt humor 
behavior and the subjects' verbal reports.
Psychophysical findings, and the essential similarities
14
between the present work and those by Wolff et and 
Roberts and Johnson, combined with the care taken to keep 
86 from awareness of the real purpose of the experiment, 
should have insured valid data in the present experiment.
Three Related Experiments
Only three experiments on humor seem closely related 
to the present one:
The first of these was performed by Wolff et al. 
These authors (1934, p. 343) were concerned with one parti­
cular mirth-provoking pattern or "thema," which is 
"another object (human being) in a disparaging situation." 
Their purpose was to determine whether differences between 
the mirth responses of Jews and Gentiles would occur when 
jokes at the expense of Jews were presented.
Of the 19 Ss, records are complete for only 15 (six 
Jews and nine Gentiles). Sixteen jokes were selected for 
presentation; eight disparaged Jews, and eight were control 
jokes. Each 8 was isolated in a room and the jokes were 
shown on a horizontal aperture. Instructions to SS.: were as 
follows:
Keep as still as you can. In this opening . . . will 
appear jokes, numbered from one to eight. After each 
joke a star will appear. When it appears, call Out loud 
your rating of the joke on a scale ranging from . . .
(-2) to . . . (+4). The score of -2 = very annoying 
. . . 0 = indifferent . . . and +4 = extremely humorous. 
Say these loudly so that I can hear you in the next 
room (p. 350).
Wolff et al. (pp. 359-360) related further procedure:
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To clinch our hypothesis in regard to unaffiliated 
objects we decided to present jokes which disparaged a 
race to which none of the Jewish or Gentile subjects 
belonged. Under these circumstances, it was supposed, 
there would be no marked differences between the res­
ponses of the two groups of subjects.
Since the jokes which we chose for the disparagement 
of Jews were all concerned with covetousness and stingi­
ness in money matters it was a simple matter to transform 
them into Scotch jokes.
The authors found, as they had before Jewish jokes 
were changed to Scottish ones, that control jokes were about 
equally appraised by Jews and Gentiles. But, counter to 
hypothesis, the Gentiles appreciated the Scotch jokes more 
than did the Jews— just as had occurred, according to 
hypothesis, before the Jewish jokes were transformed into 
Scottish ones.
Since Gentiles found Jew-disparagement jokes funnier 
than Jews did, and despite the fact that Gentiles found 
Scotch-disparagement jokes funnier than Jews did, the authors 
(p. 361) concluded:
The results of these experiments seem to demonstrate 
that the disparagement of an unaffiliated object is one 
type of mirth-evokingsTEuation . . .  a positive response 
to such a joke is an index of negative sentiments in 
respect to the disparaged object.
A second experiment on humor closely related to the 
present one was performed by Roberts and Johnson. Their major 
hypothesis, which they maintained was "derived from the theories 
of humor proposed by Freud (1917, 1928) and G. H. Mead (1934)," 
is: "The perceived funniness of a humor stimulus is positively
related to the degree to which the perceiver is able to
16
empathize vith the characters depicted in the htunor stimulus" 
(p. 57).
The authors next related their procedure and conclu­
sion:
Two judges rated the subjects' empathie associations 
to each of the cartoons. They rated each response as to 
the amount of empathy shown for the characters in the 
specific cartoon on a scale of 0 to 8, 0 indicating no 
empathy and 8 very high empathie identification. The 
interjudge correlations, or reliability coefficients for 
rating the responses to the 12 cartoons range from .57 
to .96 with an average of .86.
As a test of the hypothesis the humor ratings of the 
subjects and the empathie content of their free associa­
tions to the cartoon were correlated. An r of .78, 
significant at the .01 level, was obtained. This indicates 
that those subjects who rated the cartoons most humorous 
gave the most empathie responses to these cartoons (pp. 
59-60).
The hypotheses of the present experiment are based 
upon the above two experiments. After the hypotheses had 
been formulated and pretested, and the experiment begun, a 
very closely related experiment by Middleton appeared in the 
literature.
Middleton experimented on Negro and white reactions 
to racial humor. Each of 50 Negro SÉ were matched to each 
of 50 white on several personal characteristics. These 100 
Ss were then presented 18 jokes as a paper-and-pencil test 
in a classroom situation. After SS. had rated the jokes, 
Adorno's F-scale for authoritarianism was administered.
Four questions, designed to measure the relative acceptance 
or rejection of four elements of the Negro stereotype, were 
adjoined to the F-scale.
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. . . Negroes found the anti-Negro jokes quite as funny
as did the whites. With regard to the anti-white jokes,
however, the Negroes reacted more favorably than the 
whites. These comparisons must be accepted with caution, 
however, for the important variable of authoritarianism 
or ethnocentrism is left uncontrolled, and the Negro 
subjects in general represent a considerably higher level 
of authoritarianism (p. 178).
In keeping with his hypothesis, Middleton (p. 178)
found that among the highly authoritarian persons the whites
reacted more favorably to anti-Negro jokes than did the 
Negroes. Counter to prediction, though, among those with 
relatively low scores on the F-scale, the Negroes reacted 
more favorably to anti-Negro jokes than did the whites.
Middleton’s (p. 179) expectations for anti-white 
jokes were confirmed amongst low scorers on authoritarianism; 
Negroes responded more favorably to anti-white jokes than 
whites. In the highly authoritarian group, however, counter 
to prediction, white-Negro differences on anti-white jokes 
were insignificant.
Middleton (p. 182) also discovered:
. . . little or no evidence to support the hypothesis 
that persons who accept the validity of the Negro 
stereotype react more favorably to anti-Negro jokes 
based upon that stereotype than do persons who do not 
accept the stereotype.
As mentioned earlier, Middleton (p. 182) found that 
social class differences in reactions to humor were signifi­
cant only among the Negroes. But, he (p. 180) explained:
. . . Individuals were classified as middle class or 
lower class on the basis of whether their parents were 
in white collar or blue collar occupations. It should 
be recognized, however, that among university students 
even those with lower class backgrounds may take the
18
middle class as a reference group. Consequently these 
data should be regarded as exploratory.
Middleton seemed to make an ^  hoc observation which 
pointed up the need for the concept of reference group in 
humor experimentation. He apparently felt that where the 
family membership group is no longer the reference group 
(apparently a frequent occurrence in complex, socially 
mobile, USA), S's sense of humor may actually have reflected 
his reference— not his membership-nonreference-group.
Middleton concluded:
Some of the hypotheses based upon the theory of 
Wolff, Smith, and Murray that individuals tend to laugh 
at the expense of unaffiliated objects and not at the 
expense of objects for which they possess positive 
sentiments are confirmed by this study, but as many more 
must be qualified or rejected. In gross comparisons 
Negroes did react more favorably than whites to anti­
white jokes, but the Negroes apparently found the anti- 
Negro jokes just as funny as the white (p. 181).
Despite the crucial way in which the above three 
studies relate to the present experiment, the first two 
(Wolff et a^. and Roberts and Johnson) are clothed in the 
language of personality, rather than social, concepts. The 
Wolff et al. article, however, does allude to the social- 
psychological concept of group. But it uses the concept 
inadvertently, and nontechnically. (Such use seems hardly 
surprising, not only because the experiment focuses on per­
sonality, rather than social, concepts, but also because the 
article was published in 1934— before the concept of group 
regained fashion.)
Wolff et al. were not primarily interested in
19
experimenting in social psychology, but rather in personality:
To prove the effectiveness of our thema as a mirth- 
provoking stimulus or, in other words, to show that a 
subject laughs at his own success and his neighbor's 
failure, we should make a quantitative comparison between 
his response to disparaging jokes of which he was the 
butt and his responses to similar jokes of which a non­
affiliated object was the butt. This would be the ideal 
experiment. We could not, however, devise a feasible 
scheme for making a butt out of the subject himself, and 
so we were forced to resort to an affiliated object for 
comparison with a non-affiliated object (pp. 344-345).
The authors, then, would rather have avoided group 
identification, or any other identification, and would have 
preferred to work with jokes which directly disparaged S 
himself— so little were they interested in group identifica­
tion per se.
The experiment by Roberts and Johnson, reviewed 
above, also centered in personality concepts; it was mainly 
concerned with the relation of S's "empathie identification" 
to humor.
Although the three experiments reviewed above, in­
cluding the social-psychologically-oriented experiment by 
Middleton, lack a close affinity with the present one as 
regards technical concepts used, the ideas of all three can 
be recast into the technical concepts used here. When recon­
ceptualized thus, all three experiments seem to have yielded 
results consistent with predictions made in the present 
experiment. And yet, though the findings of these three 
studies seem sensible, the results of Wolff et al. and 
Middleton appear to contradict those by Roberts and Johnson.
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Perhaps these three studies reveal a sparse conceptual 
development which, dmitting important qualifications, makes 
the results seem contradictory— even though more adequate 
conceptual treatment would reveal that these two seemingly 
contradictory sets of results may be treated as two different 
aspects of a more comprehensive postulate.
The Wolff et al. results were presented in support 
of the contention that humor is evoked at the expense of an 
unaffiliated object, i.e., at the expense of an object with 
which one does not identify. The inadequacy of their con­
ceptualization is indicated below. After finding a signifi­
cant tendency for Gentiles to find more humor than Jews did 
in jokes at the expense of Jews, the authors stated:
To clinch our hypothesis in regard to unaffiliated 
objects we decided to present jokes which disparaged a 
race to which none of the Jewish or Gentile subjects 
belonged. Under these circumstances, it was supposed, 
there would be no marked differences between the res­
ponses of the two groups of subjects (p. 359).
Even though the authors' prediction proved wrong, 
they reasoned ad hoc:
On the face of it it would seem that since the Jews 
did not laugh as did the Gentiles at the disparagement 
of Scots, our formulation for this type of thema was 
incorrect— that is, in so far as an unaffiliated object 
was concerned. But are we certain that the Jews do not, 
or did not in this instance, affiliate themselves 
mentally with the Scots— at least in respect to their 
attitude towards money? We noted indeed, that one type 
of affiliation was based upon resemblance— affiliation 
by similarity— to the extent that subjects who are 
conscious of possessing a trait enjoy hearing that trait 
praised in others and dislike hearing it debased. Now, 
there is evidence that this type of affiliation did 
occur in the Jewish subjects (p. 361).
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The authors then pointed out that evidence for such 
affiliation is found both in subjective reports, and also in 
the fact that Scotch jokes were found relatively funnier by 
Jewish Ss than Jewish jokes were.
Although Wolff et al. seem correct in their hindsight, 
and by stating such offered excellent suggestion for future 
research, they cannot be credited with having conclusively 
substantiated their hypothesis. The scientific method is 
more than strained when results contradicting prediction are 
reinterpreted, by reasoning ad hoc, as substantiating the 
hypothesis. Even though Wolff et £l. may well be correct in 
their analysis, their mistaken prediction on Scottish jokes 
necessitates further experimentation before their hypothesis 
can be said to be verified conclusively.
The cause of their mistaken prediction, then, seems 
to lie not in a faulty hypothesis, but rather in a lack of 
sophistication as to the choice of the "neutral" group in 
testing that hypothesis. Yet the lack of sophistication 
does not appear primarily with respect to experimental design 
per se. Wolff et al.'s wrong prediction regarding Scotch 
jokes looks like a result of embedding their hypothesis in an 
inadequate conceptual framework. The authors apparently were 
led to assume mistakenly that any "race" which 8 was not a 
member of represented for him an "unaffiliated object." (It 
will be recalled that Middleton made a similar assumption 
that "lower class" university Ss would not identify with the
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"middle class.")
The use of the concept reference group, discussed 
earlier, might have prevented such mistakes— suggesting as 
it does why the predictions by Wolff et ad. and Middleton 
were erroneous. Realizing that Jews and Scotch were both 
stereotyped as stingy, Wolff et al. conveniently substituted 
Scotch names for Jewish, received a new batch of Jewish and 
Gentile then asked Ss to make judgments of "Scotch" 
jokes. Apparently, however, the Jewish ^s were all too aware 
that they too, like the Scotch, were stereotyped as holding a 
group norm of stinginess. Seeing themselves in the "same 
boat" as the Scotch, the Jews identified with them— thereby 
decreasing for those Jews the funniness of Scotch-disparaging 
jokes. Similarly, Middleton failed to realize, until after 
his results were in, that college students of lower-class 
origin might come, through collegiate experiences, to identify 
with middle-class norms.
Roberts and Johnson interpret their findings as indi­
cative that "empathie identification" and humor go hand in 
hand. Therefore, their thesis appears in contradiction to 
those of Wolff et and Middleton, who suggest that humor 
results from a lack of identification with the object. This 
is not to say that Wolff et and Middleton were unaware of 
the fact that humor judgment is not simply a question of 
identification. In fact, their comments indicate that they 
were very much aware that humor is also a function of what
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is happening to the object of affection— with whether it is 
being esteemed or abused. However, unlike the present 
experiment, these authors were not centrally concerned with 
what was happening to the object of identification. They 
dealt with jokes which made objects of identification the 
butt of the joke, and never with jokes which esteemed the 
object of identification— leaving findings which inversely 
related humor to identification.
The relationship between these three experiments, as 
concerns matters relevant to the present experiment, may be 
summarized as follows: The Wolff et and Roberts and
Johnson experiments have the fact in common, and differ 
thereby from the Middleton experiment, that the latter 
author used social psychological language whereas the former 
authors conceptualized in terms of personality theory. In 
all other respects important here, however, the Wolff et al. 
and Middleton experiments seem similar. First, as mentioned 
above, both predicted that humor would result from lack of 
identification, whereas Roberts and Johnson found humor and 
identification to be related positively. Second, Wolff et 
al. and Middleton were aware that, under certain conditions, 
identification could enhance humor, if the jokes esteemed, 
rather than disparaged, the object of affection. Roberts 
and Johnson did not make a point that what was happening to 
the object of identification did matter. Third, both only 
partially supported their non-identification-with-object
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hypotheses, whereas Roberts and Johnson successfully sup­
ported theirs. Fourth, both Wolff et al. and Middleton 
seemed to recognize ^  hoc that their failure to conclu­
sively substantiate their non-identification-with-object 
hypotheses resulted from failure to realize before the 
experiment that S may identify with a nonmembership group 
used in the experiment. (Wolff et could not readily 
conceptualize the fact, because they were writing before 
Hyman originated the reference-group concept. However, 
Middleton could and did recognize that an earlier concern 
for reference-group theory might have substantiated his 
hypothesis.)
But speculation is one thing, experimentation 
another. If the logic above is sound, and the theory use­
ful, more successful hypotheses than those by the above 
authors should be possible. The following hypotheses, 
derived from the conceptual framework discussed earlier, 
would erase the apparent contradiction between the hypo­
theses of Wolff et and Middleton on one hand, who 
predicted that humor would result from lack of identifica­
tion, and Roberts and Johnson on the other, who found humor 
to result from identification. The present hypotheses imply 
that identification enhances humor where the object of 
identification triumphs, whereas lack of identification 
enhances humor when the object is disparaged. Thus, the 




Hypothesis 1 General (ELG)
Jokes tend to be judged as funny by Ss whose refer­
ence (identification)group is esteemed, and whose outgroup 
is disparaged; and to be judged unfunny by Ss whose reference 
group is disparaged and whose outgroup is esteemed.
HIG may be broken down into the following two sub­
hypotheses :
Subhypothesis la (ELa). Jokes which esteem S's 
reference group tend to be judged as funny.
Subhypothesis lb (Hlb). Jokes which disparage S's 
reference group tend to be judged as unfunny.
The hypothesis of Roberts and Johnson, while agreeing 
with the prediction in Hla, would suggest that findings per­
taining to HIG would not warrant rejection of the null 
hypothesis; while results on Hlb would warrant rejection of 
the null hypothesis, but in precisely the opposite direction 
from which Hlb predicts. (That is, jokes which disparage S's 
reference group, by the hypothesis of Roberts and Johnson, 
should tend to be judged as funny.)
If Hlb were rephrased— predicting instead that 
"neutral" Ss would tend to judge as funny jokes which 
disparage an outgroup— the consistency of Hlb with the 
hypothesis of Wolff, Smith and Murray would become apparent.
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The conceptual framework used here, more elaborate 
than that of previous studies, also called for more controls 
governing the nature of the stimulus materials. These 
stimulus materials, consisting mainly of written jokes, in 
many ways are not comparable to the cartoons used by Roberts 
and Johnson, who indicated very few criteria as their basis 
for cartoon selection.
Since Wolff et al. used written jokes, a comparison 
with their stimulus materials is possible. (No comparison 
will be made with the stimulus materials of Middleton, as 
nothing important for purposes here is added thereby.)
Designation of Speaker's Group 
As mentioned earlier, Wolff et £l. did not use the 
term group in a technical way; they concentrated upon person­
ality, rather than social, concepts. However, Wolff et al. 
did choose their Ss from two different ethnic classes, Jews 
and Gentiles; and most Ss probably held the ethnic class 
they belonged to as their reference group. Yet, in
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designating the actors in their jokes, Wolff et did not 
directly mention the group affiliation of each. Rather, 
they used personal names vhich merely implied the ethnic 
group of the speaker. A more rigorous procedure would not 
assume the ability of ^s always to relate a speaker's name 
to his group, but would substitute group names, such as Jew, 
for personal names, like Ikey.
Dialogue
Wolff et al. were only concerned that one ethnic 
class be disparaged. Each joke in the present study used 
not only disparages one group, but esteems another (i.e., 
makes it appear triumphant). All jokes, then, involve 
dialogue.
"Serious" Jokes
An attempt was made to select jokes which would be 
taken seriously. Otherwise, S, thinking the speakers were 
only joking, might detach himself and become humored at "his 
own expense"— detachment which would likely hurt the present 
hypotheses.
Another way to encourage S to take the joke seriously 
would be by presenting dialogue between enemy groups. (The 
criteria of the present experiment would not permit S to 
disparage himself.) A joke at the expense of one's own 
group may be judged less threatening if told by an ingroup 
member than by an outsider. For these reasons, only jokes
29
were used in which dialogue occurred between representatives 
of two opposing groups. The last line always squelched the 
opponent, and invariably enhanced the final speaker's own 
group.
Antagonistic Groups 
Of course squelching an "innocent" outsider may not 
provide ego triumph to the same extent as squelching a member 
of an antagonistic outgroup. For this reason, Ss were chosen 
from a population identifying with one of four antagonistic 
groups. (These four reference groups were selected on the 
basis of their religious group norms and prevailing social 
distances between such groups.)
Considering the relative lack of controls by Wolff 
et al., that they obtained, in such a difficult experimental 
area, any significant support for their hypothesis may seem 
surprising. Yet some of their results were significant.
They established, through the use of "control jokes," that 
these differences could not be explained by a general tend­
ency for one group to be more readily humored than another.
Built-In Control 
Wolff et al. needed control jokes. With one set of 
Ss they used only jokes which disparaged Jews, while with 
another set they employed only jokes which disparaged Scots. 
Both sets of ^  included only Jews and Gentiles. The Gen­
tiles were never the butt of any experimental jokes. (Unless
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some Gentiles were Scotch, but Wolff et a^. made no such 
statement.)
Control jokes were not needed in the present experi­
ment; the control was built right into the experimental 
design. For every joke which disparaged one group and 
esteemed the other, another did the opposite. (That is, 
the design contained both possible permutations.)
For example, suppose a constant tendency exists for 
Baptists to be humored more readily than Catholics. The 
tendency would spuriously advantage the hypotheses on pro- 
Baptist-anti-Catholic jokes. But also it would work to 
disadvantage by an equal amount on an equal number of pro- 
Catholic-anti-Baptist jokes. Thus, this extraneous variable, 
which finds one group more easily humored than another, may 
be measured, then subtracted out, by a built-in experimental 
control. This internal type of control is generally con­
sidered preferable to the external one of control jokes, 
which may inadvertently introduce influential new contamin­
ating variables. See Siegel (1956, p. 62). By the same 
logic, this counterbalanced design is superior to one in 
which Ss were matched. As Siegel (1956, p. 62) has related:
A matching design is only as good as the experimen­
ter's ability to determine how to match the pairs, and 
this ability is frequently very limited. This problem 
is circumvented when each subject is used as his own 




Since the education variable seemed to need a lower 
limit, Ss were restricted to a population of high school 
graduates. Senility, on the other hand, disqualified one 
Jehovah's Witness.
Nationality
Whether or not a 8 was reared in the USA also 
appeared important; ^s were, by and large, limited to long­
term residents of this nation.
Social Contagion 
Another control concerned the order of each ^'s class 
of jokes. Each class was shuffled in an effort to randomize 
the effects of "social contagion." Shuffling was necessary 
both because Ss were tested in groups, and to randomize 
order effects.
Familiar Jokes 
Another variable which needed control concerns 
whether or not each joke had been heard before. As discussed 
earlier, Hollingworth (1911) found that some jokes "waxed" 
upon repetition and others "waned." Cattell and Luborsky 
(1947, p. 407) observed that repetition of jokes reduced 
their funniness, but that jokes known to Ss prior to the 
experiment were found more humorous than other jokes. There 
seems no need to enter into the controversy as to which 
jokes do what. Of present concern is simply whether or not
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a joke has been heard before does effect its humor value, 
and is a variable in need of control. The best control 
would have been to eliminate previously heard jokes.
Familiar jokes could be removed by using only 
original compositions. Unfortunately, the author's limited 
imagination permitted only half the jokes to be new. Old 
jokes were changed as radically as possible to prevent Ss 
from recognizing them. Jokes believed to have "made the 
rounds," or to be well known, were eliminated. After these 
three precautions, pretest Ss were asked to sort separately 
all jokes that they had heard before. Jokes which more than 
one S reported having heard before were eliminated. Analysis 
of these pretest results shows that only a small fraction of 
one percent of jokes currently used were reported as familiar. 
Nor was any consistent tendency discerned for the same joke, 
or jokes about the same group, to have been heard before. 
Through these four precautions, the heard-before variable 
seems to have been reduced to a negligible one.
Sex
The sex variable showed surprising strength in pre­
test jokes which contained sexual connotations. How S 
sorted such jokes was as predictable by his sex as by his 
religious-group identification. This extraneous variable 
was controlled by eliminating all jokes which appeared to 
hold obvious sexual connotations.
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Fatigue
Fatigue is another important variable which demanded 
control. As reported earlier, Martin (1905, p. 47) had 
observed both "fun-fatigue” and "fun-accumulation.” Personal 
fatigue from reading joke books, and comments from pretest Ss, 
had also suggested that jokes read in succession, and which 
are not woven together into a story, soon begin to lose humor 
value. Under such circumstances, "long-winded” jokes become 
tedious. It was decided, therefore: 1) to make the jokes as
short, simply worded, and easy to follow as practically 
possible; and 2) to reduce the number of jokes to the minimum 
required by an adequate experimental design.
Validity
Instructions to Ss disguised the purpose of the 
experiment. In efforts to insure valid results, a relaxed 
atmosphere was encouraged.
Attempts were made by the following procedures to 
insure S that £ would not know which results were his: at
least five Ss were tested at each session; S was not asked 
to write his name (£ stated that he was only interested in 
group, not individual, results).
Procedure
Steps In Joke Construction
A three-step procedure was commonly followed in 
selecting and constructing the jokes to be used: 1) A study
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was made of the norms of the religious experimental groups.
2) Norms were chosen which differed for the two experimental 
groups involved in the dialogue for each joke. 3) An attempt 
was made to select jokes based on such a difference between 
norms. For example, the joke regarding the Jehovah's 
Witness (JW) and flag saluting (Joke 17, Appendix A) was 
based upon JW and Catholic norms regarding the American flag.
Stimulus Materials 
The stimulus materials consisted of an Information 
Sheet and twenty-five 4 x 6  cards. On five of these cards 
was typed one of the following: Very Funny, Funny, Indiffer­
ent, Unfunny, or Very Unfunny. On each of the remaining 20 
cards was typed a joke.
In each of these jokes, dialogue occurred between 
representatives of two presumably antagonistic religious 
groups. The last speaker always gave the "punch line," and 
the victim was always the other speaker. Thus, the group of 
the last speaker was always the esteemed victor in each joke, 
whereas the other group was always the disparaged victim.
The class of 20 jokes was divided into five sets of 
four jokes each, as shown in Table 1. Only four jokes 
involving JWs occurred because this group was relatively 
infrequent in the population. More than four JW jokes, it 
was feared, would both have seemed unnatural, and have 
aroused suspicion. JWs, Catholics, and Baptists were assumed 
to identify with Christians— whereas agnostics were not.
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TABLE 1






1 I 4 Catholic JW*
1 1 17 Catholic JW
I 2 1 JW Catholic
1 2 18 JW Catholic
2 1 14 Catholic Agnostic
2 1 19 Catholic Agnostic
2 2 10 Agnostic Catholic
2 2 20 Agnostic Catholic
3 1 6 Catholic Baptist
3 1 13 Catholic Baptist
3 2 5 Baptist Catholic
3 2 16 Baptist Catholic
4 1 7 Baptist Agnostic
4 1 12 Baptist Agnostic
4 2 2 Agnostic Baptist
4 2 15 Agnostic Baptist
5 1 8 Christian Agnostic
5 1 9 Christian Agnostic
5 2 3 Agnostic Christian
5 2 11 Agnostic Christian
*JW represents Jehovah's Witness.
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This latter assumption was based upon study of the norms of 
these groups.
In each set of four jokes occurred both possible 
permutations; one group was esteemed and the other disparaged 
and vice versa. Further, each group won exactly half the 
time. For example, Set 1 found the Catholic and JW each 
victorious twice (see Table 1).
Selection of Ss 
Ss were selected on the basis of apparent identifica­
tion with one of four religious groups: Baptists, Catholics,
JWs, or agnostics. An E either selected as Ss those whom he 
or a trusted ingroup informer considered loyal to one of the 
four groups. The Information Sheet also asked which group 8 
identified with. Unless ^ checked the group he was chosen as 
identifying with, his results were discarded.
Some criteria found useful in the selection of Ss 
included: 1) group membership; 2) active participation in
the group; 3) apparent loyalty or ego-involvement ; and 
4) checking on the Information Sheet the religion presumed 
to be preferred. However, 8 did not need to show charac­
teristics 1 and 2 to be selected. Qualifications 1 and 2 
are irrelevant for occasional agnostic Ss who do not belong 
to agnostic religious groups; there is no "Agnostic Church" 
per se. However, loyal agnostics were sought who actually 
did belong to a church in which agnosticism was the norm.
Many Unitarian Churches, though not all, satisfied this
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condition.
Besides checking the expected group on the Informa­
tion Sheet, 8 to be selected needed to check two other items 
appropriately. First, that he was a high school graduate. 
Second, 8 was required to answer yes regarding whether he 
liked to consider himself a Christian, unless he was chosen 
as an agnostic, in which case he had to check no.
In this way, a total of 209 final Ss were selected. 
Included were 51 JWs, 52 Catholics, 52 agnostics, and 54 
Southern Baptists (see Appendix C).
Eliminating Ss who did not mark the three essential 
Information-Sheet questions as expected, furnished reliabil­
ity checks and probably increased validity.
Validity probably increased by this procedure because: 
When 8 gave wrong information on either of the two identifica­
tion questions at least one of two things was wrong: 1) 8
gave true information and E had judged S wrongly, meaning 8 
did not identify with that particular group, and his results 
were invalid; or 2) 8 gave false information and £ had judged 
8 correctly. In the latter case, the method acted similarly 
to the MMPI "lie scale"— eliminating Ss who were likely to 
give invalid information on the test itself. (The assumption 
here is that the ^ who gave invalid information on one part 
of the experiment was especially likely to do so on other 
parts, too. Validity increased by eliminating such Ss.)
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Selection of E 
To select an ingroup member as £ offered better 
rapport, and eliminated nonloyal Ss. On the other hand, an 
ingroup E might have caused Ss to feel their loyalty was 
under test. If so threatened, Ss may have distorted judgments 
according to E's expectations. The greater Ss* ability to 
"see through the test," the more likely they would have dis­
torted judgments so as to appear more loyal than they were.
The problems an ingroup £ created were resolved by 
indirect methods, and appropriate instructions to Ss. The 
feeling of anonymity created by group testing, and anonymous 
Information Sheets, the indirect method of tapping attitudes, 
and the misleading instructions to Ss, all were expected to 
combine to prevent the undesired distortion an ingroup E 
might otherwise create. Yet, necessary advantages were 
gained by selecting an ingroup E; namely, better rapport and 
Ss individually validated with respect to reference groups.
Instructions to Ss 
Before presenting the instructions to Ss, the two 
ways by which these instructions deliberately misled Ss, in 
order to prevent the distortion and invalidation suggested 
above, were as follows: First, Ss were told that the experi­
ment was a sociological, rather than psychological, one.
This misleading statement was intended to minimize the 
likelihood that Ss would search for, and possibly find, the 
real purpose behind this experiment— as they more likely
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might have done had they known that the test was concerned 
with "mind reading." Second, Ss were falsely led to believe 
that right and wrong answers existed— i.e., that some of the 
jokes were not really jokes at all. (One purpose here was 
to ego-involve ^s into gaining a high "sense of humor" score 
so that they would not conjecture about any more clandestine 
purpose which the test might, and did in fact, have.)
The instructions to the Ss were as follows:
Take a seat as far away from everyone else as 
possible.
You are given five label cards. You are to place 
these five label cards in front of you and from left to 
right. On your left-hand side put the card which has 
the words "Very Funny" written on it. Next to this 
card and to its right place the card which says "Funny." 
Still further to the right set the "Indifferent" card. 
The "Unfunny" card should go even further to the right. 
At the extreme right-hand side should go the last card, 
the "Very Unfunny" one.
Make sure that there is room beneath all five label 
cards to put other cards of the same size. These five 
cards then should read from left to right: "Very
Funny"; "Funny"; "Indifferent"; "Unfunny"; and "Very 
Unfunny." (Note to E.: If blackboard is available,
write those five phrases from left to right and remark 
that this is the correct order as shown.)
You may have noticed that a rubber band is found 
around each of these five label cards. Leave these 
rubber bands there for now and I will tell you what to 
do with them later.
During this sociological experiment, I am going to 
give you a set of religious jokes. But first, let me 
tell you about the purpose of this sociological experi­
ment.
We are trying to find out how good a sense of humor 
most people have. Some of these jokes on religion have 
been found to be funny by those with a real sense of 
humor. Other jokes are, strictly speaking, not really 
jokes at all. No discriminating person would find any
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humor in them.
Past experience shows that those who most accurately 
report just how funny the jokes seem to them usually get 
the best "sense of humor" scores. So, to do your best, 
just go by natural instinct in judging how funny the 
j okes are.
There is no need to put your name down anywhere as 
we only need to find out how well people do in general, 
not how you did in particular.
After you have finished, I will give you an enve­
lope to put all your materials in.
I will now pass out to you the set of jokes.
You are given a set of jokes on religion. You are 
to read each joke and then place it under one of those 
five cards in front of you, depending upon how funny it 
is. For example, I find this joke to be very funny so 
I place it under the "Very Funny" card. This next joke 
doesn't affect me much one way or another, so I put it 
under the "Indifferent" card. But don't let me influence 
you. Your jokes are in a different order from my set so 
judge each joke individually. Go by first impressions as 
jokes are usually less funny when read a second time. Do 
not change jokes around after you have sorted them once. 
Hold up your hand if you have any questions.
When you have finished sorting all these religious 
jokes into their piles, slip the jokes for each pile 
underneath the label card so that the rubber band goes 
around the whole pile, like this. (Note to E.: Demon­
strate.) Thus, all the jokes in each pile wTll be 
surrounded by a rubber band and the top card on each 
pile will be one of the five label cards. If you have 
any questions, hold up your hand.
When you finish, hold up your hand and I'll give you 
an envelope to put your five piles into.
We have only one little thing to do and then we'll 
be through.
I will now pass around an Information Sheet. Fill
41
out this Sheet. Raise your hand if you have any ques­
tions.
When you have finished filling out the Information 
Sheet; hold up your hand and I will check your materials. 
Do not leave your seat until I have checked all your 
materials. (Note to E.: Thank Ss for their participa­
tion, etc.)
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Treatment of Data 
As the hypotheses require only dichotomous data 
(i.e., non-funny and funny), statistical methods based on 
assumptions unique to more powerful scales are inappropriate. 
For this reason, among others, nonparametric statistical 
techniques were used.
The use of a nonparametric statistic is not quite as 
disconcerting as it might first appear, however. While power 
was lost by not using parametric statistics, a nonparametric 
analysis involves fewer assumptions (cf. Siegel, 1956, p. 32). 
Since this experimental area is relatively new, it seemed 
desirable both to minimize the number of assumptions, and to 
report findings which would give follow-up research as broad 
an area to work in as possible.
Each hypothesis was given a sign test. However, to 
test the sign of each joke separately would have failed to 
account for constant differences between groups in tendency 
to be humored. Such an extraneous difference could have 




The experimental design had, built into the class of 
20 jokes, both sets and permutations. Both possible permuta­
tions vere equally represented within each set, and an equal 
number of jokes (twins) occurred within each permutation. 
Following the logic of analysis of variance, irrelevant 
differences between groups were eliminated by detecting the 
magnitude of constant error thus introduced, and subtracting 
this amount from the result.
In predicting each joke, this constant error was 
taken out by comparing both groups, not merely with each 
other, but also with their own means for all four jokes 
within the particular set involved (as is shown in a formula 
presented below).
The method was developed appropriate to the following 
conditions: First, a "none-some" scale with dichotomous
data. Second, each joke was given equal weight. Third, each 
group was given equal weight (though the number in each group 
was not always equal).
The jokes sorted under five labels were treated as 
follows: The indifferent label, representing (by definition)
the point of origin, was assigned a zero (nonpositive) value. 
Positive values were given (arbitrarily) to the piles on the 
humorous side of the origin; while the labels on the unhumor- 
ous side were assigned nonpositive values. Thus were the 
five piles bunched into two categories: those to which
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positive values had been assigned, and those to which non­
positive numbers had been given. The positive (humorous) 
grouping included the Very Funny and Funny labels, while the 
nonpositive (nonhumorous) category involved the Indifferent, 
Unfunny, and Very Unfunny piles.
The constant error, discussed earlier, was then 
removed as follows: First, the proportion of Ss within the
appropriate group was found who assigned a positive (humor­
ous) value to each of the four jokes within the set. Second, 
the mean of these proportions was determined for the four 
jokes within the set. (This mean proportion represented fe 
in the positive column for the joke in question.) Third, 
the proportion of Ss within the appropriate group was found 
for the joke in question. (This proportion represented ^  
in the positive column for the group in question.) Fourth, 
the appropriate formula below was applied:
Let Gg represent the group which is esteemed in joke i.
Let Gjj represent the group which is disparaged in
j oke i.
Let Gjj represent the two neutral groups, which are
neither esteemed nor disparaged, in joke i.
Let Pgg, Pq ,^ and Pg^ represent the proportion of Ss, 
from Gg, Gj, and G^, respectively, who assign a 
positive value to joke i, i.e., who place it 
under either the Very Funny or Funny label. j^Gjj 
invariably involves a combination of two groups.
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However, the number of Ss in each of these two 
groups may not be exactly equal, and yet each 
group must be given equal weight. Therefore,
Pqu represents not the proportion of all Ss in 
Gq who assigned a positive value to joke i. 
Bather, represents the mean proportion of 
the two groups; i.e., P^^ = (Pgni +
Let lyg, and represent the mean proportion
of Ss from G@, G^, and G^, respectively, and with 
regard to joke i, who assign a positive value to 
the four jokes within set j.
Then, the following predictions follow for each joke 
in line with the hypotheses:
from HIG, Formula HIG:
(Poe - ^ (^ Gd "
from Hla, Formula Hla:
(^Ge - > (^Gn " % )
from Hlb, Formula Hlb:
(^Gn - ^ (^Gd - %d)
According to theory from which the hypotheses were
derived, the quantity on the left-hand side of >  in HIG
should be positive and that on the right-hand side should be
negative. If so, the hypothesis predicts correctly for the
joke in question. If vice versa, the result would read <,
and the hypothesis would predict wrongly for that particular
joke. However, one side of the inequality may give the
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expected sign, but the other side the reverse. It was 
decided, in such a rather equivocal event (as the inequal­
ity indicates), that the hypothesis would be supported for 
that particular joke if the correct sign were of greater 
magnitude than the incorrect— and that HIG would be found 
wrong for that joke if the opposite occurred.
Each joke was tested separately in order to rule 
out constant error which irrelevant differences between 
jokes introduced. Each hypothesis was tested by whether the 
number of jokes it predicted correctly was significantly 
above chance. (While HIG predicts for all 20 jokes, Hla and 
Hlb each relate to only 16. The discrepancy results in that, 
since the Christian represents a composite of three experi­
mental groups, Set 5 jokes involve no neutral groups.)
Abstract of Experimental Design 
This experiment may be conceived in three major 
dimensions: (1) N Ss; (2) sorted i jokes; (3) into k cate­
gories of funniness. The funniness dimension (3) may be 
dismissed for purposes here by simply saying that jokes were 
judged with respect to five categories, and the data were 
treated on a "none-some" scale.
Each of the other two dimensions may be subdivided 
into four levels of abstraction: With respect to the joke
dimension (2), there was a Class (of 20 jokes), divided into 
Sets (5), which consisted of Permutations (2), which included 
Jokes (2, i.e., twins). In decreasing order of abstraction.
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there were: Class, Sets, Permutations and Jokes.
Ss too may be conceived in four abstraction levels. 
Three of these levels are: K (which included all 209 Ss);
Groups (each of which ranged from 51 to 54 Ss); and 8 him­
self. On four of the 20 jokes a "supergroup" was involved, 
which was at the second highest order of abstraction. This 
group was the Christian (consisting of 157 Ss), which 
included all Baptist, Catholic and JW Ss. In descending 
order of abstraction there were: N; "Supergroup"; Groups;
and Ss.
Results
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of predictions by 
jokes and hypotheses. All 20 jokes came out as predicted on 
HIG; 12 of 16 on Hla; and 13 of 16 on Hlb. (For reasons 
given earlier, the four jokes belonging to Set 5 did not 
show any results on Hla and Hlb.)
Table 4 shows the significance of the number of jokes 
predicted correctly for each hypothesis. Since tests of all 
three hypotheses were significant at less than the .05 level, 
every hypothesis was substantiated.
As discussed earlier, subhypotheses Hla and Hlb tried 
to answer certain questions raised by prior experiments. Not 
only were these subhypotheses expected to be substantiated, 
but by roughly equal amounts. If this expectation is correct, 
differences between results obtained by Hla and Hlb should 
not have warranted rejection of the null hypothesis.
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TABLE 2
STRENGTH OF TRENDS IN PERCENTAGES BY JOKES AND HYPOTHESES
Joke Formula HIG Formula Hla Formula Hlb
1 f25.1 +25.7 - .6
2 +39.9 - .7 +40.6
3 +30.8
4 +24.1 + 9.0 +15.1
5 +41.3 +50.1 — 8.8
6 +40.4 + 7.7 +32.7
7 +44.2 +40.8 + 3.4
8 +26.0
9 +32.0
10 +20.1 + 7.0 +13.1
11 +26.9
12 +42.7 +35.5 + 7.2
13 +27.4 — 2.9 +30.3
14 +12.5 - 2.5 +15.0
15 +47.0 +11.1 +35.9
16 +26.8 +19.1 + 7.7
17 +12.6 - 6.4 +19.0
18 +11.5 + 8.5 + 3.0
19 +27.9 +12.9 +15.0
20 +20.2 +22.6 - 2.4
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TABLE 3
RESULTS OF PREDICTIONS BY JOKES AND HYPOTHESES
Joke HIG Hla Hlb
1 f f -
2 + — f
3
4 + +• +
5 t + -
6 + 4- +
7 + f +
8 +
9 +
10 + f +
11 +
12 + +• +
13 + - - +
14 + - +
15 + t +
16 + + +
17 + - +
18 t t +
19 + f +.
20 + + -
Eight:Wrong Ratio 20:0 12:4 13:3
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TABLE 4











fo = 20 fo = 0
fe = 10
df = 1; one-tail: p < .000001
fe = 10
Hla
fo = 12 fo = 4
fe = 8
df = 1; one-tail: p < .04
f e — 8
Hlb
fo = 13 fo = 3
fe = 8
df = 1; one-tail: p <  .02
f e — 8
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Inspection of Tables 3 or 4 clearly indicates that such was 
the case; obviously no significant difference exists between 
12:4 and 13:3, when fe = 8:8.
Another possible comparison concerned the four 
Christian-Agnostic jokes in Set 5. While this comparison 
seemed theoretically important, it was not formally incor­
porated as an hypothesis. The existence of enough compari­
sons to make a prediction was only discovered after 
completion of the experiment. Though Table 3 found all four 
of these jokes were judged as predicted, (1/2)4 means 
p > .05, an insignificant result. It later occurred to the 
author, however, that_, since the Christians represented a 
composite of three experimental groups, three predictions 
could be made for each joke.
Therefore, from Formula HIG for each of the four 
jokes there occurred three predictions: JW vs. Agnostic;
Catholic vs. Agnostic; and Baptist vs. Agnostic. Analysis 
of these results indicated that all 12 (3 x 4) predictions 
were correctr— a result significant on the one-tailed sign 
test at p <  .00025.
Discussion
The highly significant result of comparisons between 
agnostics and the three religious groups is theoretically 
interesting to the social psychologist. It indicates that 
groups (antagonistic towards each other, as the significant 
results supporting HIG indicate) who come to identify at a
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higher level of abstraction (Christian), against a common 
antagonist (agnostic), make similar Judgments (rather than 
opposite, as occurred on jokes which caused these groups to 
be opposed).
What the present experiment seems to indicate rather 
clearly for the first time, is that humor judgments are a 
function of reference groups. Further, at a more general 
level, it supports Hobbes' superiority theory of humor. The 
humor value which each joke holds for S is directly related 
to the esteem of his reference group, and is an inverse 
function of its disparagement. Neutral groups, who are not 
ego-involved in the j”dke, tend to assign to it a middle 
position— finding it neither so funny as does S whose refer­
ence group is esteemed by it, nor st^unny as does the S 
whose reference group is disparaged.
The present results suggest that of the three prior 
experiments which were related to the present one, the two 
by Wolff et £l. and Middleton were on the "right track"—  
even though their hypotheses, to the effect that humor is 
enhanced by nonidentification with the butt of the joke, 
were not fully substantiated. The apparently contradictory 
hypothesis of Roberts and Johnson, however, to the effect 
that humor is positively related to identification, was 
substantiated. Yet the present results suggest that only 
an inadequate conceptual framework allowed Roberts and 
Johnson to substantiate their major hypothesis. Influenced 
as they were by the theories of Mead and Freud, to the effect
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that humor is a direct function of "empathie ability," 
Roberts and Johnson used a personality-trait-type theory 
which failed to consider the conditions under which the 
empathie identification occurred. Were their hypothesis 
adequate, the present experiment should have substantiated 
neither HIG nor Hlb. In fact, Hlb results should have been 
exactly opposite from what they were; the group disparaged 
in Hlb would more frequently, not less frequently, have 
found these jokes funny than would the neutral, non-ego- 
involved, groups. After all, the disparaged group obviously 
held more "empathie ability" towards these particular jokes 
than did the neutral groups. Results in Hlb, then, according 
to the empathic-ability theory, should have been similar to 
Hla, as the identical jokes were involved. Hlb results, 
therefore, seem clearly to refute the "empathie" ability 
theory of Head and Freud.
Although both the major and the two subhypotheses 
were substantiated, the fact that the test of the major was 
strikingly more significant than Hla and Hlb, respectively, 
seems to require some explanation: First, even if every
joke had been predicted correctly in Hla or Hlb, since each 
predicts only 16 jokes, whereas HIG predicts 20, the result 
would have been 1/16 less significant than for HIG— i.e., 
(1/2)20 = (1/2)16 X (1/2)4, and (1/2)4 = 1/16.
Second, Hla and Hlb had "bad luck" on "close calls"—  
losing most of them. (HIG was not "lucky," however; every
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one of its 20 predictions was in the right direction by over 
11 per cent. See Table 2.)
Third, only the Catholic group failed to displace as 
predicted. The Catholic and neutral groups were paired 
against each other in 12 of 32 predictions involving either 
Hla or Hlb. Six of those 12, precisely what would be 
expected by chance, went counter to prediction. Of those 
predictions in which one of the three non-Catholic groups 
was paired against the neutrals, however, only one of 20 
proved wrong. CThat is, exactly 10 times as many jokes, 
percentagewise, directly involving the Catholic, as opposed 
to another, group, failed to follow prediction.)
Each of six times the Catholic group sorted the 
"wrong” way on HIG the probability was only about 1/20 that 
the opposing group would also judge "wrongly”; the total 
probability for these three opposing groups on HIG, roughly, 
was less than 6/20. However, in all six cases on HIG the 
opposing group came out strongly enough in the predicted 
direction to more than offset the wrongly predicted Catholic 
result. On Hla and Hlb, however, there was no opposing 
group to offset "wrong" Catholic results.
Catholic results were disappointing, not only because 
this group was the only one which did not judge strongly in 
line with predictions, but also since pretest findings on 
Catholics provided no basis for expecting this result. Pre­
testing, however, was done in the East and Southwest, while
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the experimental testing on Catholics was performed in the 
Midwest. Eastern Catholics were pretested primarily on Set 
1 jokes. Maesen, the pretester, pointed out why he was not 
surprised that Eastern Catholics judged more as predicted on 
Set 1 jokes than did Midwestern Catholics: "They (Eastern
Catholics) all were much more familiar with the JVs (than 
Midwestern Catholics were), because that's (East) where they 
(JVs) have their headquarters, and the local (Catholic) 
clergy speak out against them (JVs) more often."
Catholic Ss were pretested on Set 3 jokes in the 
Southwest, with results encouragingly in line with predic­
tions. However, that Southwestern Catholics living in the 
Southern Baptist Belt might be much more acutely aware of 
their minority-group status than the more numerous Midwestern 
Catholics, was not considered. It is not surprising, then, 
that Midwestern Catholics, probably feeling little animosity 
towards Baptists, failed to judge Set 3 jokes as predicted.
Experimental results on Midwestern (Northern Indiana) 
Catholic Ss show that one particular experimental session of 
Catholic Ss accounted mainly for the negative Catholic 
results. This experimental session was the largest, con­
sisting of 20, mostly Caucasian, nursing students. Several 
smaller groups of Negro Catholics, however, displaced very 
much as predicted, offsetting considerably the results of 
these nursing students. One reason for the above difference 
seems to be racial, as expressed by a Negro E, who tested
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Negro ^s: ’’Negro Catholics around here feel a rivalry with 
Baptists, because most Negroes are Baptists. Negro Catholics 
also feel a rivalry with JWs, since there is a large Negro JW 
Kingdom Hall in this city.” (For example, at about the same 
time, a Negro Catholic student of the author’s volunteered 
that she was experiencing marital difficulties over religion, 
her husband being a member of this same JW Kingdom Hall.)
The agnostics, the group which the author was far 
more worried about than the Catholics, actually displaced 
more in line with predictions (only one of eight jokes 
directly involving agnostics went counter to prediction on 
Hla or Hlb). This finding is especially interesting theo­
retically in that about 75 per cent of agnostic ^s are 
Unitarians, and Unitarians pride themselves on, and are 
often recognized for, intellectualism, liberalism, and free 
thinking. Catholics, on the other hand, are frequently 
stereotyped as anti-intellectual, conservative, and dependent 
upon authority. Yet, Catholic Ss in this experiment showed 
somewhat more independence in their judgments than did agnos­
tics .
As this reversal of expectation may well be due to 
sampling peculiarities, it should not prompt quick generali­
zation. However, these results do strongly suggest that if 
agnostics are nonconformists, they are conforming noncon­
formists. In other words, the S who deviates from societal 
convention may be gravitating towards a smaller unconventional
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circle in vhich he may be more of a conformist than is the 
conventional person within the larger circle of society. 
--Indeed, judgmental variability within extremist groups may 
be no more, and sometimes less, than within more moderate, 
conventional groups. (Muzafer Sherif has often made this 
observation in his lectures.)
As indicated earlier, all 12 predictions on Set 5 
jokes in HIG (for each of the three Christian groups, as 
opposed to the agnostic) came out as predicted. The 
Catholics, judging least in line with the hypotheses of the 
three Christian groups, might be expected to differ from the 
agnostics on Set 5 jokes by the smallest amount. However, 
the JWs, not the Catholics, had been expected to show the 
weakest trend on Set 5 jokes, and did. But why?
JWs, while considering themselves Christian, think 
the so-called Christian churches practice "Christendom" (a 
derogatory term for JWs), rather than "Christianity." Under 
these circumstances, JWs might hold towards the word Christian 
an attitude ambivalent— favoring the term only when it is 
applied to themselves. If, however, the JWs feel ambivalence 
towards the word Christian, their judgments should not sup- -- 
port HIG on Set 5 jokes as strongly as those of other 
Christian groups.
An occasional 8 presented results which good reason 
seemed to suggest were invalid. The scientific method 
appears to demand, however, that no S be eliminated by ad hoc
58
reasoning, no matter how convincing. Only who violate 
criteria for selecting Ss (as determined before the experi­
ment) can, and in fact must, be eliminated.
Two Ss in particular, who sorted to the detriment of
the hypotheses, and whose results, though apparently invalid, 
must be counted, include the following: A21, who appeared
to "see through" the purpose of the experiment. This agnostic 
asked E, after taking the experiment, if its "purpose was to 
see if we would laugh at ourselves."
Another sorting, probably invalid, was that ot JW7, 
who placed all 20 jokes in the Indifferent category. Maesen, 
one of the JW Es, was not surprised, and was especially 
interested in this result, because he had known that this 
particular S was a "frustrated would-be overseer" of JWs.
In other words, JW7 is suspected of having made no attempt
to discriminate between the jokes— such results as his seem
to be symptoms of frustration or hostility.
One "agnostic" S was eliminated for failing to check 
herself as an agnostic on the Information Sheet. Yet, this 
same S, in the presence of an agnostic E, and several other 
Unitarians, had called herself an agnostic— revealing, 
thereby, a discrepancy between her public and private behav­
ior. The history of the Unitarian Church shows cause for 
this discrepancy.
Several years ago, an agnostic E pointed out, the 
name Christian Register was changed to Unitarian Register,
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"because members didn't like the word Christian." (Yet, some 
"old-fashioned" Unitarian Churches still appear to favor the 
word; thus, no attempt was made to gain agnostic Ss in those 
particular places. Furthermore, as this agnostic £ added, 
older members of the more agnostic Unitarian Churches are 
still inclined to consider themselves Christians.) It is 
among the "younger set" in the more liberal Unitarian 
Churches that agnosticism is fashionable. In short, this 8, 
apparently influenced by the "group pressure" and public 
scrutiny of a younger set of Unitarian agnostics, did refer 
to herself as an agnostic. However, under anonymous experi­
mental conditions, when she may have felt alone with her 
conscience, she could be what she privately was— and could 
not bring herself to check agnostic.
Suggestions for Future Research
Now that the present hypotheses have been substan­
tiated, it is possible to reason backwards— using them as 
tentative assumptions upon which to guide future research.
One way in which these results can steer future research 
relates to differences between twin jokes. (Twin jokes refer 
to those two jokes which occur within each permutation within 
each set. Such twins are, for purposes of this experiment, 
identical.)
Had the hypotheses not been verified, twin-joke com­
parisons would not reveal as much— differences between twins 
per se do not tell which twin is the "abnormal" one. Yet,
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substantiated hypotheses can be used to serve the function 
of "background"; if one twin acts in line with the hypotheses, 
and the other does not, the one which does not may be con­
sidered abnormal. What is called for, then, is the detection 
of essential ways in which the abnormal twin differs from the 
normal. (Theoretically-rooted suggestions for future research, 
based on differences between twins, will be presented later.)
One suggestion would be an experiment to determine 
whether reference or membership groups are more important 
influences on humor judgments. Ss for whom the group in 
question is a membership-nonreference group could be compared 
with Ss for whom the group is a reference-nonmembership group. 
For instance, college students who have not yet been accepted 
into a fraternity, but identify with it, would represent 
reference-nonmembership-group Ss. Fraternity members, who 
remain so only for ulterior motives, would be considered 
membership-nonreference-group Ss. Based on theory used here, 
when an enemy group disparages the reference-nonmenbership 
group, Ss should sort the jokes as the disparaged group did 
in the present experiment; when Ss' reference-nonmembership 
group is esteemed, they should sort like the esteemed group. 
Membership-nonreference-group Ss, however, should sort jokes 
not greatly different from the way the neutral groups in the 
present experiment did.
The fraternity illustration suggests that the theory 
employed in the present experiment, if useful, ought also to
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apply in dimensions other than religious. For instance, 
loyal Democrats ought to find jokes which disparage Repub­
licans and esteem Democrats funnier than those jokes which 
do the reverse; and ego-involved Republicans ought to do the 
opposite. Political parties, races, Greek-Independent- 
student rivalry, ethnic groups— these are a few other 
dimensions in which the current hypotheses could be tested.
Besides changing the dimensions, future research 
might also vary the identification levels. Modern man seems 
to identify at abstraction levels both higher and lower than 
those used presently. For instance, the dimension used here 
is religion, and three of the experimental groups were called 
upon, by the nature of the stimulus material (jokes), to 
identify at two different levels of abstraction: the "group"
level (i.e.. Catholic or Baptist of JW), and the "supergroup" 
level (i.e., Christian). However, S might be presented with 
a joke which causes him to identify at a level still higher 
than Christian. Thus, a joke involving dialogue between a 
"religious" person and an "atheist" might cause Christians, 
Hindus, and Moslems to identify against the common atheistic 
enemy. The religious level of abstraction is a higher one 
than the Christian level, since the former includes non- 
Christian groups as well. Likewise, the Christian level is 
higher than the Catholic, etc. These different levels with­
in a particular dimension might be viewed as concentric 
circles— the bigger the circle, the higher the level of
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abstraction.
Within the "Group" circle could be placed smaller 
circles representing intragroup or inter-individual status 
striving. For instance, a joke disparaging a Catholic Priest 
might more often be funny to Catholic non—Priests, if told by 
a Catholic non-Priest, than the same jo&e would be to members 
of another religious group.
The typical socialized adult in modern society seems 
to carry around in the "back of his mind"' numerous dimensions 
and levels of identification. Yet, these levels and dimen­
sions do not operate simultaneously and ail at once to govern 
his judgments. If they did, life for him would be but chaos 
and confusion. Rather, which dimension and which level "pops 
into mind" at a given moment seem to be the weighty factor in 
judgmental determination, and to act as a function of the 
nature of the stimulus condition (joke). (Such theory is out­
lined as above, because its implications for humor research 
seem too numerous to enable specific experiments to be 
appropriately elaborated here.) Also, concentric-circle- 
levels-of-identification theory is supported by results on 
Set 5 jokes, which, as mentioned earlier,, actually demonstrated 
that three Christ:rn groups, who displaced differently on sets 
suggesting intra-Christian rivalry, actually sorted similarly 
when the other speaker became an outsider" (agnostic).
Students of humor, puzzled by the apparent ability of 
some people to laugh at themselves, commonly suggest that
63
perhpas two types of humor— "ethnocentric," and "philosophi­
cal"— exist. Ethnocentric humor is viewed as the common, 
vulgar type, and seems to fit well with Hobbes' superiority 
theory of humor (the general notion from which the present 
hypotheses are derived). Philosophical humor, however, is 
looked upon as what is "really" meant by a sense of humor, 
and only comes to a select few of sufficient age and wisdom.
But is such a dichotomy (suggesting, as it seems to, 
that two different sets of psychological principles are 
required to explain humor) necessary? Or does it but reflect 
some rather loose thinking by these theorists? Which ques­
tion receives a "yes" answer has broad implications for 
future research. But how could Hobbes' superiority theory 
account for the ability, often reported, of some people to 
laugh "philosophically" at themselves?
First, if no humor is involved, Hobbes' theory has 
no explaining to do. This study opened by questioning the 
assumption that laughter and humor are one-to-one related. 
Perhaps a person laughs at his own expense, not because he 
is humored, but since he does not want others to think him a 
"poor sport." Humor research is recommended, therefore, con­
cerning the social conditions under which humor and laughter 
are, and are not, correlated. But how could the superiority 
theory explain genuine humor at one's own expense?
Second, perhaps a person is humored at "his own 
expense" only because the joke is not costing his ego
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anything. At least several ways seem to exist in which such 
detachment can occur: (A) His membership group, as suggested
earlier, may not be his reference group. In such an instance, 
holding no ego-involvement in the membership group, S may 
feel no loss at its disparagement. In extreme instances, S 
may actually despise the group, but not feel that he can 
withdraw from membership safely. In this case, and based 
upon superiority theory, S might actually find more humor in 
seeing "his" group made the butt of a joke than would a 
neutral outsider enjoy seeing S’s group disparaged. (B)^ 
may hold conflicting reference groups. In this event, if one 
reference group attacks another, he might find the joke 
funny— perhaps identifying more strongly with the attacking 
group than the disparaged, so that a lesser ego loss is sur­
mounted by a greater gain. (C) The level of identification 
which certain nouns in the joke cause to gain conscious 
awareness may be different from what the humor theorist 
suspects. For example, as discussed earlier, perhaps a 
Catholic S may find a joke funny in which a Catholic Priest 
is the butt, not because S judged a Catholic (part of his 
own ego) to be attacked— but rather since S, a non-Priest, 
conceived that only Catholic Priests were attacked. (Sugges­
tions for future research involving (A) and (C) have already 
been discussed.) (D) S may be humored at the expense of 
what he conceives to be, not his present self, but his former 
self— as when a man is humored by a faux pas he committed as
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a child.
The above discussion indicates testable reasons as 
to why Ss who "laugh at themselves" may appear to, but not 
really, contradict Hobbes' superiority theory of humor. 
However, as the present experiment indicates, if the group 
disparaged is S's reference group, rather than simply his 
membership-nonreference group, and if the victor belongs to 
another, preferably enemy, group, then ^ is unlikely to find 
the joke funny. Rather, support of Hlb shows that disparaged 
groups were especially likely to find these jokes unfunny.
Of course, if the joke is told by an ingroup member, and if 
8 feels no ego-involvement with the group anyway, then he 
might be as likely as most non-ego-involved outsiders to 
find the joke funny. (But such were not the conditions of 
the present experiment.)
At least one other way (E) appears possible for 8 to 
be humored at "his own expense" without violating the super­
iority theory— that is, when the joke itself seems so incon­
gruous, ridiculous, or absurd that 8 cannot take it seriously 
(cannot be threatened by it). Sherif and Hovland (1953), and 
La Pave and Sherif (1959) have demonstrated that attitudinal 
statements close to S's own position tend to be assimilated, 
i.e., displaced towards his position, while statements 
further away tend to be contrasted (displaced away from his 
own position). Perhaps statements still further removed 
from S's own position will seem "so far out in left field"
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as to appear humorous.
For instance, an "insult" may seem so unjust that it 
is judged as humorous, rather than insulting— a kind of humor 
sometimes referred to as irony. This type of joke (which 
seems more directly related to an incongruity, rather than 
superiority, theory of humor) may be judged equally funny by 
the group disparaged and the group esteemed— since neither 
feels a real ego loss or gain from it, the joke being too 
ridiculous to be taken seriously.
But how can such jokes be identified? The present 
experiment suggests a method: analyze the "abnormal" member
of twin jokes. One might suspect that especially funny jokes 
(those with high humor medians) would show a lack of vari­
ability between groups; such jokes, ridiculous or incongruous 
enough that every group finds them funny, would fail to sup­
port the hypotheses. (However, no jokes in the present 
experiment failed to come out as predicted on HIG.) Another 
type of joke which might not be displaced differently by 
antagonistic groups is one in which the group is disparaged 
or esteemed for an "unrealistic" reason, i.e., a reason which 
seems to have no connection with the norms of that group.
(Lack of "realism" in some jokes may help explain why some 
"abnormal" twins are found on Hla or Hlb.)
An experiment could be set up similar to the present 
one, except that the twins would not remain twins; one former 
twin would disparage a given group for no "good" reason, 
while the other would belittle a major value of that group.
CHAPTER IV 
SÜHMART AND CONCLUSIONS
A "superiority theory" of humor was tested by relating 
humor judgments to reference groups. Hypothesis HIG states 
that jokes tend to be judged as funny by Ss whose reference 
(identification) group is esteemed, and whose outgroup is dis­
paraged, and to.be judged unfunny by Ss whose reference group 
is disparaged and whose outgroup is esteemed. Also expected 
to support the major hypothesis are jokes which cause Ss to 
identify at the "supergroup" level. Hypothesis Hla: jokes
which esteem Ss' reference group tend to be judged as funny; 
Hlb: jokes which disparage Ss' reference group tend to be
judged as unfunny.
Four experimental groups (Catholics, Jehovah's Wit­
nesses, Southern Baptists, and agnostics), each containing 
over 50 Ss, were asked to sort 20 jokes on religion into five 
degrees of funniness. Each 8 was chosen only if both a 
participant observer and 8 himself indicated the appropriate 
one of these four groups as S's reference group. (These four 
particular groups were selected because each has traditionally 
felt unfriendly towards the other three.) A built-in
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experimental control means that each joke which esteems one 
group and disparages another is counterbalanced by a joke 
which does the opposite.
A sign test substantiated all four predictions; and, 
on HIG all 20 jokes were judged as predicted (p <  .000001).
Results show that conflicting findings among previous 
studies regarding the relationship between humor and identifi­
cation are resolved through a more rigorous experimental 
design— and that the concept of reference group, applied 
within the context of a "superiority theory" of humor, leads 
to such success in predicting humor judgments as earlier 
studies were unable to demonstrate.
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Joke 4. Catholic: Is it true that in your religion every
man is a minister?
Jehovah's Witness: Certainly! What is so funny about that?
Catholic: I was just thinking of what a large congregation
each of you must have.
Joke 17. Catholic: Why are you tied to this telephone pole?
Jehovah's Witness: Some devils did it just because I refused
to salute the American flag. Untie me Brother!
Catholic: Do you not believe that refusal to salute the flag
is the only true way?
Jehovah's Witness: Yes, and the Truth shall make you free.
Catholic: Then you need no help from me. Let the Truth,
which you have followed, set you free.
Joke Catholic: I thank God that I don't question any­
thing. I accept things on faith.
Jehovah's Witness: What? You mean you are thankful for
your ignorance?
Catholic: I am!
Jehovah's Witness: Well then you have a lot to be thankful
for.
Table 1.
^The 20: jokes are presented in the order shown in
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Joke 18. A Jehovah's Witness and a Catholic met on a narrow 
walk:
Catholic: I never make way for a fool.
Jehovah's Witness (letting Catholic pass): Don't you? I
always do.
Joke 14. Agnostic: I have noticed that Catholics are quite
stupid when it comes to matters of religion. For 
example, can you tell me the difference between an 
agnostic and a Buddhist?
Catholic: I think so. A Buddhist is going into Purgatory
whereas an agnostic is going straight to Hell.
Joke 19. Agnostic: Have you heard the story about the argu­
ment between the Catholic and the jack ass?
Catholic: No, but I'll bet in your version of it the agnos­
tic won.
Joke 10. Agnostic: What is an archbishop, a successor to
the peaceable apostles, doing marching at the head 
of a train of soldiers?
Catholic Archbishop: Aye, but I do not head these soldiers
as an archbishop, but as a prince of Strasburgh.
Agnostic: Then if the prince of Strasburgh should go to the
devil, what will become of the archbishop?
Joke 20. Catholic Priest: You are an agnostic aren't you.
You don't know whether or not there is a God.
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Agnostic: That is true.
Catholic Priest: Well, why don't you become a martyr so you
can go to Heaven and find out?
Agnostic: You are a priest aren't you. You want to save
souls from Hell.
Catholic Priest: Of course.
Agnostic: Well, why don't you go there?
Joke 6. Baptist: It looks to us Baptists like you Catholics
make too much fuss over the Virgin Mary.
Catholic: It is not surprising that natural things should
look strange to you Baptists. After all, who can see
clearly when he spends so much time with his head
under water.
Joke 13. Baptist: Why do you call that fish you just caught
a Baptist fish?
Catholic: Because they spoil so fast after you take them out
of water.
Joke Catholic: Where was your religion before Luther?
Baptist: Did you wash your face this morning?
Catholic: I did sir.
Baptist: Then where was your face before it was washed?
Joke 16. Catholic: We have a very good reason for being
opposed to birth control, a fact which you don't 
seem to realize.
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Baptist: I know why. You are opposed to birth control
because the only converts you can win are your own 
children.
Joke 7. Agnostic: Do you really believe that silly story
about Jonah being swallowed by a whale?
Baptist Preacher: When I get to Heaven, I will ask Johah.
Agnostic: But supposing he is not there?
Baptist Preacher: Then you will have to ask him.
Joke 12. Agnostic: Why do you allow me to see you while
you deny yourself to all your friends?
Ill Baptist Minister: I feel confident of seeing my friends
in the next world, but this may be my last chance of 
seeing you.
Joke 2. Baptist Minister: Hell contains nothing but roulette
wheels, whiskey and chorus girls.
Agnostic: Oh death, where is thy sting I
Joke 15. Baptist Minister: Why don’t you ever come to hear
me preach?
Agnostic: I have conscientious scruples against going to
places of amusement on Sunday.
Joke 8. Agnostic: It may interest you to know that I am not
sure that Heaven exists.
Christian: (Nods head, goes on reading.)
Agnostic: You don’t realize what I’m trying to make clear.
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I want you to understand that I don't for a single, 
solitary moment believe that such a place as Heaven 
exists.
Christian: All right, all right, go to Hell I Only don't
make so much fuss about it.
Joke 9. Agnostic: If Jesus Christ returned, his only
accomplishment would be to get crucified again.
Christian: Perhaps. But the accomplishment would not be
his alone. It would be with the help of skeptics 
such as you.
Joke 3. Christian: Why did so many Christians come over to
America?
Agnostic: To worship in their own way, and make others do
the same.
Joke 11. Christian: An agnostic, is a blind man groping in 
a dark cellar for a black cat that isn't there.




Age _______  Sex: Male   Female______
Nation most of your life was spent in: United States______
Other _____
If answer to the above is the "United States," mention
states you have lived in, and number of years lived 
in each one:
Education: (Check level of highest education)
Less than 12 years _____
High School Graduate _____
Years of College = 1 ___ = 2   = 3   = 4
College Graduate _____
Some Graduate Work
Religious Preference: Check the religion which you prefer
above all others:





Church of Christ _____
Jehovah's Witness _____
Methodist _____





HUMOR JUDGMENTS BY CATHOLIC GROUP
Joke VF F I UF VUF Totals
I 10 19 10 11 2 52
2 27 20 5 0 0 52
3 0 12 16 9 15 52
4 6 19 12 12 3 52
5 6 17 6 14 9 52
6 7 20 12 9 4 52
7 15 26 7 2 2 52
8 21 22 6 2 1 52
9 1 7 20 11 13 52
10 0 11 12 15 14 52
11 6 11 19 11 5 52
12 11 22 11 5 3 52
13 6 20 10 8 8 52
14 6 17 8 15 6 52
15 12 21 6 10 3 52
16 5 14 7 8 18 52
17 2 15 15 11 9 52
18 13 21 6 7 5 52
19 12 20 11 7 2 52
20 16 12 __5 15 4 52
Totals 182 346 204 182 126 1040
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TABLE 6
HUMOR JUDGMENTS BY JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES GROUP
Joke VF F I UF VUF Total
1 13 21 14 1 2 51
2 9 21 8 11 2 51
3 0 16 19 11 5 51
4 1 4 18 22 6 51
5 4 8 19 11 9 51
6 3 14 20 9 5 51
7 6 11 13 17 4 51
8 3 20 12 13 3 51
9 0 8 19 17 7 51
10 1 3 24 17 6 51
11 2 11 19 14 5 51
12 6 13 18 11 3 51
13 5 22 12 10 2 51
14 2 9 23 13 4 51
15 10 14 15 9 3 51
16 5 17 13 8 8 51
17 0 3 15 22 11 51
18 15 17 14 5 0 51
19 4 7 22 13 5 51
20 __3 19 12 15 __2 51
Totals 92 258 329 249 92 1020
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TABLE 7
HUMOR JUDGMENTS BY AGNOSTIC GROUP
Joke VF F I UF VUF Total
1 8 16 17 6 5 52
2 22 21 3 4 2 52
3 10 23 7 6 6 52
4 6 8 22 8 8 52
5 2 13 19 11 7 52
6 -6 13 16 8 9 52
7 4 28 6 9 5 52
8 6 21 12 9 4 52
9 1 3 22 15 11 52
10 5 13 17 10 7 52
11 13 19 11 6 3 52
12 4 23 15 8 2 52
13 7 11 14 12 8 52
14 3 10 17 12 10 52
15 15 24 9 2 2 52
16 7 7 20 10 8 52
17 2 12 14 14 10 52
18 4 28 10 5 5 52
19 3 11 15 15 8 52
20 18 17 __8 7 2 52
Totals 146 321 274 177 122 1040
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TABLE 8
HUMOR JUDGMENTS BY BAPTIST GROUP
Joke VF F I UF VUF Total
1 8 18 21 5 2 54
2 3 14 13 17 7 54
3 2 7 16 15 14 54
4 4 15 24 7 4 54
5 13 28 10 2 1 54
6 0 1 5 21 27 54
7 26 25 2 0 1 54
8 25 18 6 1 4 54
9 16 17 15 4 2 54
10 6 9 22 10 7 54
11 2 9 19 16 8 54
12 22 23 6 2 1 54
13 0 1 6 25 22 54
14 7 14 19 10 4 54
15 1 8 19 15 11 54
16 14 15 16 5 4 54
17 4 15 19 13 3 54
18 16 16 12 7 3 54
19 7 16 21 6 4 54
20 __4 11 13 15 11 54
Totals 180 280 284 196 140 1080
